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tions wherein the injured party was actually aware that some injury had
been sustained before the end of the statutory period. On that basis they
are to be distinguished from the Mosby case.
Therefore, Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital was a case of first impres-
sion at the appellate level in the Illinois Courts. As such, it is bound to
serve as precedent for later hearings of similar cases in the state, and it is
likely that under the existing statutory law of Illinois the result will be the
same in subsequent cases. However, Mosby did not make any changes in the
existing case law of the state; it merely extended that rule which already
prevailed.
It is important to note, however, that the court was not pleased with the
opinion it felt constrained to hand down in the principal case. Justice
Dempsey, speaking for the court, expressed the opinion that a more equit-
able result could have been obtained by commencing the statute of limita-
tions at such time as the plaintiff became aware of the malpractice. That
the court felt this to be beyond the scope of its power, however, was expressed
by Justice Dempsey's final comment that, "Relief must come from the legis-
lature and not from the courts."31
In Mosby, while the resulting decision was harsh on the plaintiff, it was
the only decision at which the court could arrive. The "end of treatment"
rule could not have been employed as Mrs. Mosby had not remained within
the care of the hospital long enough to bring her action within the statutory
time period under the provisions of that rule. And, for the court to allow
the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was merely ignorant of her cause
of action would have been to flout the statute, as interpreted by this writer,
by not setting it in motion when the cause of action accrued. Therefore, the
court was compelled to apply the rule which starts the statute of limitations
immediately upon the infliction of the injury. In this instance that was
immediately upon the completion of the operation.
Until there is a legislative reform, the courts shall continue to be
obliged to issue judgments which are inequitable in cases where the plain-
tiff, though not defrauded by the plaintiff, remained ignorant through no
fault of his own, that a cause of action existed for him.
E. WM. BEDRAVA
CONTRACTs-EXCULPATORY CLAUSE-CONTRACTUAL EXEMPTION FROM
LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE HELD ABSOLUTE DEFENSE-The case of Owen v.
Vic Tanny's Enterprises, 48 Ill. App. 2d 344, 199 N.E.2d 280 (1st Dist. 1964),
provides an opportunity to reexamine the question of the validity of con-
tractual clauses which purport to exempt one of the contracting parties
from the legal consequences of his own negligence.
3' Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 342, 199 N.E.2d 633, 636
(1st Dist. 1964).
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The Owen case is almost identical to that of Ciofalo v. Vic Tanny
Gyms,1 a New York case, decided in 1961. In both cases, the plaintiff was a
member of the defendant's gymnasium, and sought to recover for personal
injuries resulting from a fall on the slippery floor near the defendant's swim-
ming pool. In each case, as a condition of membership, the plaintiff had
signed a membership contract which contained an exculpatory clause read-
ing in part as follows:
Member, in attending said gymnasium and using the facilities and
equipment therein, does so at his own risk. Tanny shall not be
liable for any damages arising from personal injuries sustained by
Member in, on or about the premises of any of said gymnasiums.
Member assumes full responsibility for any injuries or damages...
and he does hereby fully and forever discharge Tanny . . . from
any and all claims . . . resulting from or arising out of Member's
use or intended use of the said gymnasium ... 2
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, held in Owen, as did the
New York Court of Appeals in Ciofalo, that the exculpatory clause included
in the membership contract was valid and effectively prevented the plain-
tiff's recovery. In so holding, the court pointed out that exculpatory clauses
are to be construed strictly and, in cases of ambiguity or lack of clarity, are
to be construed against the party seeking to exculpate itself-which is
almost invariably also the party responsible for drafting the agreement.3
However, the court found that the language used in the Vic Tanny member-
ship agreement was clear, explicit, and unequivocal.4
Since the court found no problem in the construction or interpretation
of the exculpatory clause, it was forced to decide the question of its validity.
In so doing, it relied primarily on two earlier Illinois decisions in which
the validity of exculpatory clauses in leases had been upheld.
In the first of these cases, Jackson v. First National Bank,5 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that contracts by which one seeks to avoid the legal
consequences of his negligent behavior are generally enforceable in Illinois,
unless (1) it would be against the settled public policy of the State to enforce
them, or (2) there is something in the social relationship of the parties
militating against upholding the agreement.
These criteria are neither so definite nor so independent as they may at
first appear. Very frequently, the social relationship of the parties deter-
mines the nature of the public policy with respect to them. However, an
1 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925 (1961). In both cases, the locale of the accident, the
nature of the injury, the language of the membership agreement and the identity of the
defendant were the same.
2 Owen v. Vic Tanny's Enterprises, 48 111. App. 2d 344, 345, 199 N.E.2d 280, 281
(lst Dist. 1964).
3 Ibid. The court cited Moss v. Hunding, 27 Ill. App. 2d 189, 169 N.E.2d 396 (lst
Dist. 1960).
4 48 I1. App. 2d at 347, 199 N.E.2d at 281.
5 415 Ill. 453, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953).
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examination of cases suggests that the criterion of "settled public policy" is
the more conservative, and the criterion of "social relationship" is the more
liberal. In other words, if a court can be shown by sufficient clear precedent
that exculpatory clauses have been invalidated in situations similar to the
one in question, or, alternatively, if a legislative enactment has declared
them to be contrary to the public policy of the State, as in Illinois with
respect to leases,6 the court may well hold the clause to be invalid as con-
trary to settled public policy.
In the case of O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty,7 the second
case relied upon by the court in deciding Owen, the Illinois Supreme Court
reviewed a variety of situations in which the settled public policy of the
State had been used to invalidate exculpatory clauses. These included
contracts between common carriers and shippers,8 regulated public utilities
and their customers,9 and employers and employees.' 0 These categories
correspond to those which the Restatement of Contracts includes as agree-
ments in which exculpatory clauses are illegal," although the Restatement
also includes a provision that "a bargain by a common carrier or other
person charged with a duty of public service limiting . .. damages ... is
lawful."12
The reasons given for the invalidation of exculpatory provisions on
public policy grounds are varied. They include, among others, the concept
that certain relationships create duties between the parties above and
beyond the duties expressed in the contract between them, or, as expressed
by an Illinois appellate court, "One cannot exempt himself by contract from
negligence in cases of public duty imposed by law."' 13 The California Civil
Code expresses the same idea in these words:
Anyone may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his
benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contra-
vened by a private agreement. 14
The concept of public duty imposed by law has been applied to com-
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 80, § 15a (1963). "Every covenant, agreement or understanding
in . . . connection with . . . any lease of real property ...exempting the lessor from
liability for damages for injuries . . . caused by or resulting from the negligence of the
lessor ... shall be deemed to be void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable."
7 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958).
8 Crane v. Railway Express, 369 Ill. 110, 15 N.E.2d 866 (1938); Chicago and N.W. Ry.
v. Calumet Stock Farm, 194 Ill. 9, 61 N.E. 1095 (1901); Chicago and N.W. Ry. v. Chapman,
133 Ill. 96, 24 N.E. 417 (1890).
) Tyler, Ulman & Co. v. Western Union Tele., 60 Ill. 421 (1871).
10 Campbell v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 243 Ill. 620, 90 N.E. 1106 (1910).
11 Restatement, Contracts § 575 (1932).
12 Ibid.
13 Cerny Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co., 347 Il1. App. 379, 106 N.E.2d 828 (1st Dist.
1952).
14 Cal. Civ. Code § 3513.
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mon carriers,15 professional bailees, 16 public utilities, 7 innkeepers,18 and
banks.19 A fairly certain yardstick in years past was whether or not a business
was sufficiently important to the public welfare to qualify for regulation.
If so, it would be denied the right of exculpation, or it would be permitted
that right only under certain fairly well defined circumstances, usually
including regulations permitting merely limitation of liability.
In the background in decisions concerning common carriers and public
utilities, and clearly present in decisions involving the landlord-tenant
relationship, was the criterion of the degree of monopoly in the market.
If the court found monopoly, the clause was invalidated. If it did not, the
clause was upheld. For example, in O'Callaghan the court, upholding the
validity of an exculpatory clause in a lease, said:
The relationship of landlord and tenant does not have the monop-
olistic characteristics that have characterized some other relations
with respect to which exculpatory clauses have been held invalid.20
Since "settled public policy" solves the problem for those engaged in
public callings, for regulated businesses, for enterprises which are clearly
monopolies, for employer-employee situations, and in Illinois-by statute-
for landlord-tenant contracts, we are left with a variety of miscellaneous
situations, of which Owen v. Vic Tanny is one, to which Illinois courts
apply the criterion of "social relationship of the parties."
Contractual agreements of the kind for which public policy has not
become settled, either by statute or case law, arise under a great many
varied circumstances. For example, there is the case of the inexperienced
horseback rider who, after explaining her need for a gentle horse, is given a
contract with an exculpatory clause-and a wild horse.21 There is also the
case of the charity patient who signed an exculpatory agreement in order to
secure emergency medical treatment at a hospital operated by the University
of California,22 and there is the case of the woman who signed an agreement
with such a clause in order to park her car.23 In all three of these cases, the
15 Santa Fe P. & P. Ry. v. Grant Bros. Constr. Co., 228 U.S. 177, 33 Sup. Ct. 474 (1912).
16 Miller's Mutual Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951); Palotto
v. Hanna Parking Garage Co., 68 N.E.2d 170 (Ohio App. 1946); Gulf Transit Co. v. United
States, 43 Ct. Cl. 183 (1908).
17 Denver Consol. Elec. Co. v. Lawrence, 31 Colo. 301, 73 Pac. 39 (1903); Emery v.
Rochester Tele. Corp., 156 Misc. 562, 282 N.Y. Supp. 280 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 246 App.
Div. 787, 286 N.Y. Supp. 439 (1935).
18 Oklahoma City Hotel Co. v. Levine, 189 Okla. 331, 116 P.2d 997 (1941).
19 Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank of Scranton, 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954); Speroff
v. First Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948).
20 O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 440, 155 N.E.2d 545,
546 (1948).
21 Palmquist v. Mercer, 263 P.2d 341 (Cal. App. 1954), modified, 43 Cal. 2d 92, 272
P.2d 26 (1954).
22 Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 23 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1962), rev'd, 32 Cal. Rptr.
33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
28 Miller's Mutual Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N.C. 20, 65 S.E.2d 341 (1951).
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exculpatory clause was declared void; in the first on the theory that the
contract was fraudulent and in the second and third because of the relative
bargaining power of the parties. In 1955, the United States Supreme Court
declared void such a clause in a contract between a tugboat company and
the owner of a number of barges. This decision also rested on the relative
bargaining power principle.2 4
In cases involving hairdressers and their customers,2 5 toboggan slides
and their customers, 26 laundries and their customers, 27 and automobile
rental agencies and their customers,28 the courts in a number of states have
upheld exculpatory clauses either on the theory that the plaintiff could
secure the goods or services elsewhere (absence of monopoly in the market)
or that he really did not need them anyway (a purely voluntary, private
agreement toward which public policy is neutral).
The Court of Appeals of New York and the Appellate Court of Illinois
determined in the Vic Tanny cases that:
... [T]here is no special legal relationship and no overriding pub-
lic interest which demand that this contract provision . . . be
rendered ineffectual. Defendant . . . was under no obligation or
legal duty to accept plaintiff as a "member" or patron. Having con-
sented to do so, it had the right to insist upon such terms as it
deemed appropriate. Plaintiff, on the other hand, was not required
to assent to unacceptable terms or to give up a valuable legal
right.29
This language suggests that the court will consider (1) whether or not
the defendant has a legal duty to accept the plaintiff as a customer; (2) the
converse, whether or not the plaintiff would lose a valuable legal right by
declining to sign an agreement which contained an exculpatory clause.
The type of social relationship which might, in an Illinois court,
invalidate an exculpatory clause is implied in another case in the follow-
ing language:
There is no rule of public policy which makes such provisions in-
effective, particularly when the obligee is under no disadvantage
by reason of confidential relationship, disability, inexperience or
the necessities of the situation.30
If the people of the State of Illinois feel that agreements of this type
are undesirable as a matter of policy, they will apparently find it necessary
24 Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 75 Sup. Ct. 629 (1955), discussed
in 42 Il. B.J. 229 (Nov. 1955).
25 Barrett v. Corrigan, 302 Mass. 33, 18 N.E.2d 369 (1938).
26 Broderick v. Ranier Nat'l Park Co., 187 Wash. 399, 60 P.2d 234 (1936).
27 Manhattan Co. v. Goldberg, 38 A.2d 172 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1944).
28 Ostando v. U-Dryvit Auto Rental Co., 296 Mass. 439, 6 N.E.2d 346 (1937).
29 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1961).
30 Charles Laebman Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 79 F. Supp. 206, 207 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
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to secure legislation to that end. The courts of this State are reluctant to
invalidate such provisions except in those situations in which statute or
precedent gives them no alternative.
MRS. B. SIDLER
TRADE REGULATION-TRADE SECRETS-Ex-EMPLOYEE'S USE OF FORMER
EMPLOYER'S TRADE SECRET MAY BE ENJOINED--In the case of Schulenburg
v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615 (4th Dist. 1964), the
Appellate Court of Illinois was confronted with the question of whether
an ex-employee's use of a former employer's trade secret constituted unfair
competition so as to necessitate the issuance of an injunction.
The plaintiff purchased plans for producing electrical flashers' from
his previous employer in 1945 at a cost of under three thousand dollars,2
and began manufacturing and selling these devices. The four defendants
had been employees of plaintiff for many years (two of the defendants were
employed nearly twenty years) during which time they learned the process
for manufacturing such flashers. In 1959, one defendant, having disagreed
with the plaintiff over company policies, decided to terminate his employ-
ment, form his own company and compete with the plaintiff in the
business of manufacturing flashers. The remaining defendants terminated
their employment with the plaintiff and joined the competing firm. The
plaintiff filed suit in October, 1959, seeking to enjoin the defendants on
the basis of unfair competition from using the plaintiff's alleged trade
secret. The Circuit Court granted an injunction restraining defendants
from the further manufacture and sale of competing flashers.
On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that its manufacturing know-how was
a trade secret which had been imparted in confidence to the defendants
while employees, and that the defendants had abused that confidence by
using the trade secret in manufacturing a competing product to the plain-
tiff's financial detriment. The defendants contended that the plaintiff was
not possessed of a trade secret and that the defendants used only general
skills and knowledge of the plaintiff's operation acquired through em-
ployment. The Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, find-
ing that the plaintiff's blueprinted know-how qualified as a trade secret,8
that the defendants copied and memorized the plaintiff's trade secret, and
I A mechanical device for automatically making and breaking electrical circuits and
thereby causing lights of signs to alternately flash on and off in various patterns. Brief
for Appellees, p. 2, Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Il1. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615 (4th
Dist. 1964).
2 The cost of developing information is a factor to consider in determining whether
or not a trade secret exists. Restatement, Torts § 757, comment b (1939).
3 Plaintiffs considered their know-how a trade secret and attempted to keep it
confidential; the secret was disclosed to defendants as select employees; the secret was not
divulged or abandoned by marketing the finished product; and the secret was not
connected with business. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., supra note 1.
